Protection of minors: Brussels reins in Paris without derailing its fight against social media

The detailed opinion issued by the European Commission on MP Laure Miller’s bill could have represented a serious setback for the French government. The legislation, which seeks to prohibit children under the age of 15 from accessing social media, has indeed been partially rejected by Brussels. Yet within the office of Anne Le Hénanff, the Minister Delegate for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Affairs, the message is very different. France, officials insist, is “entitled to act”. The principle of a minimum age has been endorsed, and the Commission’s criticisms are said to concern only the measures introduced by the Senate.

This interpretation reflects a more nuanced legal reality. While Brussels does not challenge the objective pursued by Paris, it firmly reiterates that Member States are no longer free to design their own regulatory frameworks for digital platforms. Since the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force, protecting minors has remained a national competence, whereas the rules governing platforms are now largely harmonised at European level.

This episode constitutes one of the first major political clashes between a national initiative and the European Union’s new platform legislation. Behind the dispute between Paris and Brussels lies a more profound transformation: digital regulation is entering a new phase in which governments retain the political initiative but have considerably less legal room for manoeuvre.

Brussels forces French lawmakers back to the drawing board

The European Commission’s opinion was particularly eagerly awaited because, under Directive 2015/1535, France was required to notify the bill before its final adoption, since it introduced new rules liable to affect the internal market. This procedure allows Brussels to assess whether national legislation is compatible with European law before it enters into force.

The bill changed significantly between its passage through the National Assembly and the Senate. Although both chambers shared a common objective—introducing a minimum age of 15 for access to social media—they differed considerably over how to achieve it.

The version championed by MP Laure Miller was based on enshrining a general prohibition on social-media access for children under 15 in French law, while leaving its implementation to European law and the platforms themselves.

The Senate opted for a more interventionist approach. Senators introduced a “blacklist” mechanism to identify the platforms concerned, created a parental exemption for certain services and strengthened the role assigned to ARCOM, France’s media and digital regulator. Each of these provisions immediately raised questions about its compatibility with the Digital Services Act.

Although the Commission endorses the objective pursued by France, it has also issued a detailed opinion—a procedure reserved for legislation containing provisions that appear incompatible with EU law—effectively requiring part of its architecture to be rewritten.

This task now falls to the joint parliamentary committee, which is expected to prepare new wording without compromising the objective of bringing the legislation into force at the beginning of the new school year.

Brussels endorses the objective but rejects a specifically French regulatory regime

The Commission’s opinion is not primarily concerned with the age threshold of 15, but with the instruments selected to enforce the prohibition.

The first point of contention is the creation of a list of social networks prohibited for minors. The Senate proposed that a ministerial order, issued after consultation with ARCOM, should identify the platforms concerned. The idea might have appeared pragmatic, as it would have made it possible to exclude certain services or rapidly adjust the scope of the rules in response to market developments.

For Brussels, however, this approach is incompatible with European law.

The Digital Services Act is based on a principle of maximum harmonisation. Member States cannot create their own categories of platforms or individually determine which companies should be subject to specific obligations. The relevant definitions already exist under European law, notably through the DSA and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Obligations must be applied on the basis of these common definitions.

The same reasoning applies to the parental exemption proposed by the Senate. Its operation would have required platforms to collect and verify parental consent, thereby creating new operational obligations for them. Once again, the Commission points out that a Member State cannot impose such a mechanism when it concerns an area already harmonised at European level.

The third disagreement concerns ARCOM. Senators wanted to strengthen its role in identifying the platforms concerned and overseeing the scheme. The Commission notes that the powers of national Digital Services Coordinators are already defined by the DSA. ARCOM retains an essential supervisory and coordinating role but cannot be granted powers that would alter the institutional balance established by the European regulation.

This reminder marks a departure from France’s previous major pieces of digital legislation. Paris long developed its own regulatory mechanisms, sometimes inspiring subsequent European legislation. The Digital Republic Act, the law against online hate speech and several provisions governing platforms followed this approach.

The DSA reverses this dynamic. Member States can still define political objectives, but they no longer enjoy the same freedom to build their own regulatory instruments. Oversight mechanisms, obligations imposed on platforms, the role of national authorities and the applicable procedures are now largely determined at European level.

Behind the dispute, the Digital Services Act is already imposing its rules

The confrontation between Paris and Brussels might be interpreted as an isolated disagreement over a particular bill. In reality, it reveals a far deeper transformation in European digital governance. What is at stake in the Miller bill extends well beyond the protection of minors: it reflects the gradual emergence of the Digital Services Act as the primary legal framework for every digital platform operating in Europe.

Since it became applicable, the DSA has often been presented as a regulation that imposes greater transparency on platforms, strengthens the fight against illegal content and governs algorithmic recommendation systems. While accurate, this interpretation is incomplete. The regulation also pursues a second, less visible but equally important objective: preventing Member States from introducing multiple national regimes that could fragment Europe’s digital market.

The opinion addressed to France illustrates this purpose. At no point does the Commission challenge the political objective of protecting minors. It does, however, reiterate that technical mechanisms, obligations imposed on platforms, the powers of national authorities and oversight procedures are now governed by largely harmonised legislation.

This represents a profound change from the previous decade. For several years, Europe’s major capitals used digital policy as a legislative laboratory. Germany led the way with its NetzDG legislation against online hate speech. France launched multiple initiatives concerning platforms, terrorist content, online hate and transparency obligations. Each Member State experimented with its own solutions, some of which would later contribute to future European legislation.

The DSA reverses this logic. The European Union is no longer seeking to coordinate national laws but is directly establishing a single framework with which Member States must comply. National initiatives remain possible, but they can no longer undermine the common architecture.

This shift is visible in each of the points challenged by Brussels: France cannot establish its own list of platforms, create a national parental-consent mechanism that imposes new obligations on digital services, or redefine the powers of its regulator beyond those provided for by European legislation. In each instance, the Commission’s response rests on the same principle: these matters are already governed by the DSA.

This approach also reflects the Commission’s political determination. Faced with global companies such as Meta, TikTok, Snap and X, Brussels believes that effective regulation depends on uniformity. Twenty-seven different legal regimes would create legal uncertainty for businesses, complicate enforcement and offer platforms opportunities for regulatory arbitrage between Member States. A single framework, by contrast, allows regulators to negotiate with the major platforms at the scale of the European market—more than 450 million consumers.

The real battle now begins: age verification

As parliamentary discussions advance, a central question arises: how can users’ ages be verified effectively without compromising their privacy or transforming the internet into a vast identification system?

It is precisely on this ground that the next regulatory battle will be fought.

The French government acknowledges that the legislation will not impose any particular technology. Age verification is already governed by European law and the guidelines issued under the Digital Services Act. Platforms will therefore have to demonstrate that they operate sufficiently robust mechanisms to prevent minors from gaining access when required by law.

Behind this obligation, however, lies a considerable technological challenge. The solutions currently available remain imperfect. Simple self-declarations of age are easily circumvented, while credit-card verification creates accessibility and data-protection concerns. Identity-document checks raise privacy and cybersecurity issues. AI-based age-estimation systems, relying on facial recognition or biometric analysis, are already generating significant ethical and legal debate.

The European Union is now pursuing a more sophisticated approach. The future European Digital Identity Wallet, or EUDI Wallet, is intended to allow citizens to prove specific facts—such as being over a particular age, their place of residence or their identity—without disclosing all their personal data. Under this model, a platform would not necessarily need to know a user’s identity. It might receive only confirmation that the person is above a particular age threshold.

This approach relies on selective-disclosure technologies and cryptographic proofs, which make it possible to verify a fact without revealing all the underlying data. Long confined to academic research and experimental projects, these technologies are gradually entering the field of European regulation.

This development is also creating a new industrial market. Behind the parliamentary debates, companies specialising in identity verification, digital identity management, trust infrastructure and cryptographic proof solutions are already emerging. As European obligations become more precise, these businesses could become strategic suppliers to the largest platforms.

Protecting minors is therefore no longer merely a matter of public policy. It is becoming a driver of technological innovation and a rapidly developing market. Platforms will have to adapt their infrastructure. Digital identity providers will have to meet unprecedented security and data-protection requirements. Governments, finally, will have to reconcile their political ambitions with a technical ecosystem largely defined at European level.

The emerging debate foreshadows future discussions about European digital identity.

French legislation that could become a European model

At first glance, France appears to have emerged weakened from its confrontation with Brussels. Several flagship provisions introduced by the Senate will have to be abandoned or substantially rewritten. Yet viewed beyond the immediate parliamentary process, the outcome appears considerably more nuanced.

The government retains the central element of its political ambition: establishing a minimum age of 15 for access to social media under French law. On this point, the Commission explicitly confirms that Member States have the authority to act.

Until now, many governments had hesitated to intervene in this area, fearing that they would come up against the principle of harmonisation under European law. The Commission’s opinion on the French bill clarifies its position: a Member State may establish an objective for protecting minors, provided that it respects the mechanisms set out in the Digital Services Act.

If the joint parliamentary committee returns to wording close to that adopted by the National Assembly, France could therefore become the first European country to implement a minimum age compatible with the DSA.

Spain, Greece, Denmark and Ireland have already begun considering similar restrictions on minors’ access to social media. Several governments are closely following the French debate, aware that the outcome of the bill will help clarify the room for manoeuvre available under European law.

The DSA as the new economic constitution for platforms

This affair reveals a much deeper shift in European digital governance. Under the Digital Services Act, the Commission is no longer merely establishing obligations for platforms; it is also defining the limits within which Member States can intervene.

The DSA is therefore acquiring a function comparable to that long performed by European competition and internal-market rules. It establishes a common foundation with which both companies and Member States must comply.

This centralisation follows an economic as well as a political rationale. Brussels favours a uniform framework to avoid regulatory fragmentation, which could turn the European market into a patchwork of incompatible regimes.

European digital sovereignty no longer consists solely of adopting common rules governing major platforms. It also requires Member States to accept that they must share their own regulatory authority in this field.

In the future, whenever a government seeks to regulate conversational assistants, AI agents, digital marketplaces, recommendation systems or new forms of targeted advertising, it will face the same challenge: reconciling national political ambitions with an increasingly powerful European legal framework.

Member States retain the political initiative, but Brussels now writes a growing share of the rules. As regulation becomes more centralised, the most decisive negotiations will take place in Brussels, where platforms, industrial companies and trade associations will have to intensify their lobbying efforts if they want their voices to be heard.